Essay: Milgram and the Banality of Evil

When does obedience become a moral risk rather than a virtue? When people stop thinking and simply obey, evil flourishes.

By Keisuke Noda, Ph.D.

(This essay is part of the podcast Encounters - a mini-philosophy series built around short episodes—each one an encounter with a question, a thinker, or a tension that invites reflection rather than conclusion. Encounters puts philosophy as a living conversation, presenting the themes of what it means to be human in the age of AI, a time of temptation, of power, and the search for meaning.

Dr. Noda, a philosopher, educator, and Vice Provost at HJI Graduate School for Peace & Public Leadership in Manhattan brings us to this essential conversation. https://www.encounters-philosophy.org/episodes/en/002-milgram).

How obedience to authority can override conscience without cruelty or malicious intent, echoing Hannah Arendt’s insight into the banality of evil.

Reflection

Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments revealed a disturbing possibility: ordinary people may inflict harm not because they are cruel, but because an authority defines the situation and assumes responsibility.

Milgram’s work suggests that moral judgment does not vanish—it is reassigned. When individuals come to see themselves as instruments of a system, responsibility shifts upward. Harm becomes procedural rather than personal.

The episode then turns to Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment and the Third Wave, where obedience gives way to role-absorption and group identity. Here, authority is no longer only external; it is internalized through roles, language, expectations, and belonging.

Hannah Arendt’s account of the banality of evil: wrongdoing can emerge not from monstrous intent, but from ordinary people acting without reflection—embedded in routines, roles, and systems that discourage thinking. (Photo by Joel Montebon)

Seen together, these cases trace a single progression: obedience to authority, absorption into roles, and the quiet force of conformity. None require hatred or sadism. What they require is the gradual suspension of independent judgment.

This is why these experiments are often read alongside Hannah Arendt’s account of the banality of evil: wrongdoing can emerge not from monstrous intent, but from ordinary people acting without reflection—embedded in routines, roles, and systems that discourage thinking.

The unsettling question is not why people are cruel. It is how easily normal participation can replace moral responsibility.

Questions for Thinking

• When does obedience become a moral risk rather than a virtue?

• How do institutions distribute responsibility in ways that weaken conscience?

• What makes it difficult to pause, question, or refuse when harm feels normalized?

• How can judgment be preserved inside powerful systems?

Contemporary Resonance

Modern organizations depend on hierarchy, procedure, and division of labor. These structures are not inherently wrong—but they can create moral distance. In such settings, harm rarely appears dramatic. It appears as routine work, carried out efficiently and without reflection.

This episode invites a pause: not to accuse, but to notice where responsibility quietly dissolves—and where it might be reclaimed.